







Abstract		Recent	 developments	 in	 communication	 and	 information	 technology	 have	 disrupted	 the	 long-established	dominance	of	mass	media	over	the	production	and	distribution	of	news.	As	an	effort	to	reclaim	their	role	of	society’s	 information	gatekeeper,	media	companies	absorb	digital	 technology	as	instruments	of	institutional	power	to	reproduce	its	own	logic	in	the	digital	space.	This	paper	dis-cusses	 two	 interrelated	modalities	 of	 algorithmic	 news:	 economically	 efficient	 production,	where	news	 outlets	 utilize	 quantitative	 metrics	 to	 improve	 content	 effectiveness	 and	 desirability;	 and	shared-gatekeeping,	where	visibility	 and	distribution	of	 information	are	 contextual	 and	based	on	users’	behaviour.	The	paper	proposes	that	algorithmic	media	hides	under	its	supposed	objectivity	and	 neutrality	 to	 become	 a	 new	 gatekeeper	 “organism”,	which	 not	 only	 regulates	 flows	 of	 infor-mation,	but	also	interprets	and	negotiates	both	public	interests	and	the	value	of	the	news.	
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(Pariser,	2012),	in	which	people	are	exposed	only	to	information	from	like-minded	individuals,	am-plifying	confirmation	bias.	One	of	the	particularities	of	the	“algorithmic	turn”	in	the	media	sector	is	related	to	the	intensive	use	 of	 digital	 technologies	 and	 large	 volumes	 of	 data	 (i.e.,	 big	 data)	 to	 enhance	 decision-making	about	 the	production	of	 content	and	 the	preferences	of	 the	audience.	According	 to	O’Neil	 (2016),	the	general	assumption	is	that	algorithmic	media	has	more	objective	and	efficient	ways	to	deliver	content	to	the	public	using	a	user-centric	model:	the	news	becomes	contextualized	in	relation	to	the	reader.	It	is	a	response	to	“growing	quantities	of	available	data,	as	well	as	a	motivator	for	media	or-ganizations	to	gather	ever	more	data	 from	every	available	source	to	 feed	 into	massive	processing	capacities	 of	 these	 algorithms”	 (Napoli,	 2014,	 p.	340).	 However,	 “algorithms	 are	 encoded	 proce-dures	for	transforming	input	data	into	a	desired	output,	based	on	specified	calculations”	(Gillespie,	2014,	p.	167).	That	is,	algorithmic	media	are	becoming	the	fundamental	principle	that	governs	the	flows	of	information	on	which	we	depend.	This	paper	proposes	 that	algorithmic	media	 is	a	new	 form	of	gatekeeper	 “organism”,	 in	which	they	not	only	regulate	flows	of	 information,	but	also	 interpret	and	negotiate	both	news	value	and	public	interests.	To	demonstrate	that	algorithmic	media	is	not	disrupting	journalism	practices	and	values,	but	rather	reproducing	them	in	the	digital	space,	this	paper	examines	two	interrelated	mo-dalities.	First,	it	considers	the	efficiency	of	news	productions,	where	media	companies	utilize	auto-mation	and	A/B	 testing	 to	 improve	effectiveness	and	desirability	of	 content.	Next,	 it	 analyzes	 the	visibility	 and	 distribution	 of	 information	 based	 on	 user	 behaviour,	 location,	 and	 other	 non-disclosed	attributes,	as	a	form	of	shared	gatekeeping.		













Moreover,	they	can	be	used	to	govern	users’	behaviour	in	ways	that	are	not	always	obvious	since	the	 code	 is	 usually	 protected,	 opaque,	 and	not	 easy	 to	 read	 or	 even	 to	 be	 stopped.	 Thus,	we	 can	think	of	 algorithmic	media	as	a	new	 form	of	gatekeeper	 “organism”	 that	 regulates	 flows	of	 infor-mation	with	the	capacity	to	influence	public	opinion.		
Efficient	Production		Media	organizations	are	 increasingly	turning	to	data	and	algorithms	to	 find	efficient	ways	to	pro-duce	and	deliver	content	(C.	W.	Anderson,	2013).	One	common	practice	is	to	learn	what	their	audi-ence	wants	next.	Netflix,	for	instance,	has	been	investing	in	the	creation	of	original	content	based	on	the	 users’	 behavioural	 data	which	 the	 company	 harvest	 continuously	 from	 their	 system	 (ratings,	number	of	shows	viewed,	hours	spent	on	each	show,	etc.)	(Vanderbilt,	2013).	Transferring	produc-tion	decision	to	the	machine	may	seem	to	be	a	disruption	in	the	realm	of	the	motion	pictures,	long	praised	as	a	form	of	art.	Rather,	it	is	a	continuity	in	the	logic	of	capital.	Systematization	and	optimi-zation	 are	not	 strange	 to	 capitalist	 society	 (Dyer-Witheford,	 1999),	 since	 companies	 are	 continu-ously	looking	for	the	most	effective	and	profitable	way	to	produce	a	new	product.	The	next	sections	explore	how	 this	 tendency	 can	be	problematic	 in	 the	newsmaking	domain	 since	 it	deals	not	only	with	 the	distribution	of	 information	as	a	public	good	but	also	with	 the	 formation	of	opinions	and	ideologies.	
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one	chosen	by	the	majority	of	 the	readers.	However,	while	this	can	work	well	 to	 increase	reader-ship	and	sales,	it	does	not	necessarily	deliver	the	most	interesting	content.	The	question	is	not	qual-itative,	but	a	quantitative	one,	since	readers	do	not	directly	compare	and	evaluate	the	quality	of	two	titles	and	choose	the	best	one.	In	fact,	the	best	title	is	the	one	that	receives	more	clicks:	not	the	most	
interesting,	but	the	one	with	the	best	performance.	The	headlines	are	not,	however,	just	revolving	doors	that	screen	and	count	readers	as	they	enter	the	story;	they	also	carry	discursive	meaning	in	themselves	(Andrew,	2007;	Dor,	2003).	A/B	testing	can	be	used	to	manipulate	the	audience	to	increase	revenue	reproducing	the	so-called	“click	bait,”2	as	 well	 as	 to	 reinforce	 cultural	 and	 social	 biases.	 Indeed,	 what	 are	 the	 implications,	 biases,	 and	tendencies	that	might	emerge	from	a	title	selected	by	the	first	wave	of	readers?	What	happens,	for	instance,	when	a	newspaper	does	an	A/B	testing	at	7	am	in	Montreal	when	people	in	Vancouver	are	still	asleep?	Moreover,	 the	participants-readers	are	not	aware	of	the	experiment,	which	can	cause	distortions	 in	 the	way	 that	 an	 event	 is	 represented:	 readers	 cannot	 know	 if	 they	 are	 getting	 the	right	information	or	even	the	same	information	as	other	readers.	It	is	possible	that	a	series	of	blind	tests	and	the	use	of	black	box	algorithms	in	news	practices	can	provoke	serious	consequences,	in-cluding	alternative	ways	to	describe	an	event	that	reaffirms	social	bias	and	delivers	what	the	audi-ence	want	to	see,	not	what	the	news	is	about.	
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state	of	the	world	and	frame	stories	that	best	suit	the	audiences.	In	other	words,	beyond	simply	re-porting	on	the	data,	the	machine	interprets	it	for	us.	What	becomes	evident	by	the	rhetoric	of	the	companies	that	produce	these	tools	is	the	promise	that	these	bots	will	write	more	comprehensive	and	objective	stories	than	any	human	reporter.	Not	surprisingly,	algorithmic	media	operates	under	the	same	assumption	as	more	traditional	media.	It	is	perceived	as	objective	and	reliable	to	produce	representations	of	reality,	following	the	same	val-ues	 long	attached	to	the	 institution	of	 journalism.	Additionally,	 these	examples	demonstrate	tech-nologies	used	to	produce	short	reports	on	subjects	that	are	highly	quantitative,	such	as	natural	dis-asters,	financial	updates,	and	sports	events.	In	the	long	run,	however,	the	civic	impact	of	such	tech-nologies	may	be	more	problematic.	What	happens	when	media	companies	start	to	use	these	meth-ods	to	report	on	qualitative	events	that	are	harder	to	measure,	or	at	least	controversial	by	nature,	such	as	political	and	social	issues?	What	specific	sets	of	data	would	interpret	the	world	for	us?	It	is	important	to	understand	who	is	going	to	define	the	parameters	of	these	machines,	based	on	what	kind	of	epistemology	and	political	ideology	they	will	be	built	on,	and	for	what	purpose.		
Shared	Gatekeeping		In	the	digital	age,	the	amount	of	generated	data	available	to	the	reader	has	grown	exponentially,	but	our	 capabilities	 to	 absorb	 this	 information	 have	 not	 increased.	 According	 to	 Bozdag	 (2013),	 it	 is	precisely	 “because	 the	mind’s	 information	 processing	 capacity	 is	 biologically	 limited,	 we	 get	 the	feeling	of	being	overwhelmed	by	the	number	of	choices	and	end	up	with	‘bounded	rationality’”	(p.	211).	Not	surprisingly,	news	organizations	began	to	use	algorithms	to	assist	audiences	navigating	the	increasingly	complex	and	fragmented	media	environment:	search	engine,	recommendation	sys-tems,	aggregators,	data	curation,	and	customization	to	facilitate	search,	navigation,	and	selection	in	a	 content	 overloaded	 environment	 (C.	 Anderson,	 2006).	 To	 a	 certain	 extent,	 content	 has	 become	commodified,	with	its	true	value	residing	in	the	system	built	to	aid	users	to	navigate	and	select	from	the	profusion	of	available	content	(Napoli,	2014),	and	create	and	share	more	information.	Performing	all	 of	 these	 actions	manually	without	 the	help	of	 technology	 is	no	 longer	practical	nor	effective.	On	the	consumption	side,	news	organizations,	including	those	that	insist	upon	avoid-ing	such	categorization	(Herbst,	2016)	such	as	search	engines	and	social	media,	use	algorithms	in	two	non-exclusive	ways:	selection	and	visibility.	These	two	interrelated	functions	often	occur	in	a	sequence	and	can	be	understood	as	a	set	of	filters.	Furthermore,	they	resonate	the	roles	of	journal-ism	identified	earlier:	 in	response	to	a	 ‘problem	of	scale’	(Lesage	&	Hackett,	2014)	 it	provides	re-ports	about	meaningful	and	interesting	events	(Wolf,	1987).	
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ventures	 following	certain	social	and	cultural	 ideologies,	 they	are	prone	to	biases	as	much	as	any	other	previous	mass	media	channel.	In	the	selection	stage,	a	search	engine	will	automatically	crawl	the	web,	while	a	social	network	site	will	 collect	 information	produced	by	 its	users.	 It	 appears	 that	 the	outcome	—	a	 collection	of	links	and	social	media	posts	—	is	representative	of	reality.	However,	these	results	have	a	number	of	limitations,	such	as:	off-line	information	is	certainly	absent;	not	all	digitally-available	information	is	accessible	to	the	algorithm	(e.g.,	newspapers,	and	scientific	 journals	paywalls);	privacy	protection	in	social	media	content	can	prevent	 the	search	engine	 from	collecting	 information.	Moreover,	 if	a	source	has	 a	 bad	 reputation,	 like	 an	 illegal	website,	 or	has	 copyright	 infringements,	 it	 can	be	 ex-cluded	or	blocked	from	the	search	selection	by	the	search	engine	owners.	However,	because	infor-mation	filtering	is	an	automated	process,	it	might	be	manipulated	by	third-party	activities,	such	as	the	 case	 of	 Search	 Engine	 Optimization	 (SEO)	 techniques,	 or	 “like	 farms”	 on	 Facebook	 (De	 Cris-tofaro,	Friedman,	Jourjon,	Kaafar,	&	Shafiq,	2014).	To	avoid	and	inhibit	these	strategies,	commercial	organizations	have	a	tendency	toward	internal	process	opacity,	creating	protocols	to	prevent	oth-ers	from	“gaming”	the	system,	to	protect	competitive	advantages,	as	well	as	to	promote	their	own	services	and	products.	This	is	precisely	the	reason	that	Google	puts	its	own	services	at	the	top	of	the	search	results	and	that	Facebook	prioritizes	its	own	video	platform	(Bucher,	2012;	Bozdag,	2013).	Sorting	and	prioritizing	this	information	is	another	crucial	step,	resembling	the	concept	of	news	value	 (Wolf,	 1987).	 Popularity	 is	 the	most-used	metric	 in	 classifying	 information:	while	 a	 search	engine	gives	more	weight	to	information	coming	from	popular	websites	in	order	to	support	majori-ty	interests	and	values,	a	social	media	platform	prioritizes	engagement	with	the	content.	A	Google	search	result,	for	instance,	only	shows	ten	websites	at	a	time	and	tends	to	favour	popular	sources	of	information	which	have	more	hyperlinks	 leading	 to	 these	 sites,	 are	optimized	 for	mobile	phones,	and	are	paid	to	be	at	the	top	of	the	list.	Some	authors,	like	Flichy	(2008),	have	called	this	phenome-non	 “googlearchy”	 (Google	 +	 hierarchy).	 However,	 similar	 to	 the	 A/B	 testing,	what	 the	 audience	clicks	the	most	is	not	always	the	most	interesting	or	newsworthy	piece	of	information.	If	in	the	past	newsworthiness	was	defined	by	journalistic	deontology,	the	opacity	of	algorithmic	media	makes	it	more	complicated	to	define	what	is	newsworthy	in	a	fast,	dynamic,	and	very	personalized	environ-ment.		
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mation	about	their	audience,	which	make	it	is	possible	to	“target”	individual	readers.	That	is,	to	dis-play	or	allow	access	to	stories	specifically	tailored	to	users	based	on	their	locations,	behaviour,	and	preferences.	Consider	the	case	of	Twitter’s	Trend	topics	that	provides	users	with	a	list	of	the	most	popular	subjects	currently	being	discussed	on	 the	platform.	This	 list	 is	algorithmically	 tailored	 to	each	user	based	on	their	location,	language,	and	the	people	they	follow,	as	well	as	the	topics’	“fresh-ness”.	The	large	number	of	variables	results	in	a	dynamism	that	can	also	lead	to	unpredictability	of	what	is	really	a	“trend”	at	any	given	time	in	the	system,	showing	users	only	what	they	already	ex-pect	to	see.	Ultimately,	this	raises	questions	of	censorship,	as	in	the	controversy	over	the	seemingly	premature	disappearance	of	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	movement	from	the	Twitter	Trends	list	(Gilles-pie,	2012).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 term	“trend”	might	even	have	 lost	 its	meaning,	becoming	more	 like	a	“click	 bait”	 based	 on	 the	 user’s	 bias,	 since	 the	 trends	 list	 distorts	 (and	perhaps	manipulates)	 the	sense	of	reality,	making	people	believe	that	some	topics	are	more	important	than	others	in	a	given	moment.	This	is	a	major	concern	because	of	the	influential	role	search	engines	and	social	media	have	to-day.	They	are	perceived	as	objective	and	reliable	representations	of	relevant	online	content,	similar	attribute	long	attached	to	journalism.	In	other	words,	“the	algorithms	that	are	at	the	core	of	search	engines	 are	 functioning	 in	 a	 political	 capacity	 similar	 to	 established	media	 institutions”	 (Napoli,	2014,	p.	348).	Not	surprisingly,	news	organizations	create	and	use	algorithms	that	embed	their	in-stitutional	nature,	including	political	and	ideological	inclinations.	For	instance,	election	results	can	be	affected	by	manipulation	of	search	engine	rankings.	It	is	a	common	practice	now	to	look	up	can-didates’	profiles	using	search	engines	and	social	media.	Depending	on	how	the	algorithms	rank	pos-itive	and	negative	news	stories	on	the	screen,	it	can	have	an	enormous	influence	on	the	way	people	vote:	 it	 is	estimated	that	Google	could	determine	the	outcome	of	upwards	of	25	percent	of	all	na-tional	elections	(Epstein	&	Robertson,	2015;	Pfeiffer,	2014).	These	examples	put	algorithmic	media	protocols	in	resonance	with	traditional	media	practice	in	relation	to	the	presence	or	lack	of	media	coverage	over	specific	issues	within	political	contexts,	which	also	reaffirms	their	role	as	gatekeep-ers.	
	
Subjectivity	




are	heavily	 investing	 in	 “profiling”	users	 to	 reach	a	higher	 level	of	personalization,	which	 can	 re-duce	 the	 structural	 biases	 inherent	 to	 popularity-based	 metrics.	 That	 is,	 by	 combining	 various	sources	of	data,	such	as	demography,	location,	technical	information	captured	by	electronic	devices,	personal	preferences,	and	inferred	behaviour	derived	from	online	activities,	media	companies	can	tailor	and	deliver	the	“most	interesting”	news	according	to	the	user’s	definition	of	interesting.	However,	this	is	quite	opposite	from	reporting	public	interest	stories:	the	importance	to	report	on	 events	 that	 somehow	 impact	 the	 public	 life,	 including	 those	 that	 are	 unknown	or	 exceptional	(Bucher,	 2012;	Wolf,	 1987).	 Algorithmic	media	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 lock	 individuals	 in	 a	 “social	bubble”	in	which	people	are	exposed	only	to	information	from	like-minded	individuals,	amplifying	confirmation	bias	(Pariser,	2012).	Or,	as	Bozdag	(2013)	puts	it,	“online	services	can	cause	citizens	to	be	ill-informed	about	current	events	and	may	have	increasingly	idiosyncratic	perceptions	about	the	importance	of	current	events	and	political	issues”	(p.	218).	Personalization	improves	accuracy	at	the	expense	of	serendipity.	The	problem	is	that	in	the	long	run,	it	will	assist	us	to	unconsciously	avoid	facts	and	opinions	we	disagree	with,	potentially	undermining	deliberative	democracy	by	lim-iting	contradictory	information.		
Conclusion		The	news	report	is	not	simply	a	collection	of	random	symbols;	it	obeys	some	sort	of	rule.	Media	or-ganizations	encode	information	on	behalf	of	the	individual	based	on	routine	decisions	and	accord-ing	 to	 a	 set	 of	parameters	 (language,	practices,	 goals).	As	Hall	 (1980)	 states,	 “the	event	must	be-come	a	‘story’	before	it	can	become	a	communicative	event”	(p.	129).	At	that	moment,	the	rules	of	society	act	upon	the	event;	there	are	social	and	political	consequences	when	an	event	is	designated	as	important	or	interesting:	production	constructs	the	message.	Algorithms	are	not	neutral	and	objective	machines.	Quite	the	opposite;	they	reflect	a	certain	ide-ology	embedding	a	set	of	rules	and	practices:	they	prescribe	a	way	to	do	things.	Like	any	other	insti-tution,	news	organizations	are	ideological	and	have	specific	social,	cultural,	economic,	and	political	agendas.	 In	 this	 domain,	 algorithms	 serve	 as	 prime	 examples	 of	 constructors	 and	 codifiers	 of	knowledge,	particularly	in	the	context	of	search	engines,	social	media,	and	news	portals,	which	play	a	 central	 institutional	 role	 in	 aggregating,	 categorizing,	 organizing,	 and	broadcasting	 information.	Consequently,	the	adoption	of	algorithms	in	newsmaking	practices	by	traditional	and	new	media	is	not	disrupting	journalism	practices	and	values,	but	rather	reproducing	them	in	the	digital	space.	Perhaps	what	is	different	about	the	algorithms	adoption	in	the	newsmaking	practice	is	the	level	of	automatization,	since	 they	are	built	 to	run	without	any	human	assistance.	As	a	consequence,	 it	seems	that	we	are	losing	our	ability	and	even	our	wiliness	to	inquire	about	the	world.	Algorithmic	media	reads	data	without	asking	any	questions;	it	just	repeats	what	is	embedded	in	its	codes.	They	rely	on	data	and	internal	assumptions,	both	subject	to	biases	and	errors,	which	might	produce	un-expected	and	unintended	consequences.	Yet,	they	go	beyond	their	assumed	role	and	function	of	aid-ing	 in	media	production	and	consumption,	 as	 they	 serve	as	 instruments	of	 institutional	power	at	the	same	time	 that	 they	are	shaped	by	 the	already-defined	rules	and	protocols	of	 the	 institutions	that	use	them.	In	this	sense,	algorithmic	media	are	nothing	less	than,	and	indeed	no	different	from	any	attempt	to	formalize	idealized	newsmaking	practices	and	protocols	to	establish	the	authority	of	hegemonic	power	to	control	flows	of	information.		
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1.	I	do	not	mean	to	argue	that	technology	has	absolute	power	over	the	user,	but	to	emphasize	the	accelerated	feedback	loop	in	which	digital	technology	is	built	upon.	Users	often	do	have	some	level	of	agency	to	actively	avoid	algorithmic	logic,	as	well	as	to	reappropriate,	hack,	and	hijack	technolo-gy	in	different	ways	through	everyday	practices	(see	De	Certeau,	2002;	Proulx,	2009).	2.	Click	bait	is	an	advertising	strategy	to	attract	attention	and	encourage	visitors	to	click	on	a	link	that	usually	has	little	or	no	connection	with	the	content	being	linked.	It	is	often	paid	for	by	the	ad-vertiser	or	generates	income	based	on	the	number	of	clicks.		
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